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iABSTRACT
This work targets at investigating direct communications as a promising technology
for the next-generation 5G wireless ecosystem that improves the degrees of spatial
reuse and creates new opportunities for users in proximity. While direct connectivity
has originally emerged as a technology enabler for public safety services, it is likely to
remain in the heart of the 5G ecosystem by spawning a wide diversity of proximate
applications and services. Direct communications couples together the centralized
and the distributed network architectures, and as such requires respective enablers
for secure, private, and trusted data exchange especially when cellular control link
is not available at all times. Within the research group, the author was tasked to
provide the state-of-the-art technology overview and to propose a novel algorithm
for maintaining security functions of proximate devices in case of unreliable cellular
connectivity, whenever a new device joins the secure group of users or an existing
device leaves it. The proposed solution and its rigorous practical implementation de-
tailed in this work open door to a new generation of secure proximity-based services
and applications in future wireless communications systems.
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11. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have been witnessing the proliferation of bandwidth-hungry user
applications, which are becoming ubiquitous in the form of multimedia services, in-
teractive games, and social networking solutions [1]. To effectively cope with the
resulting avalanche of mobile traffic, fifth generation (5G) networks demand inno-
vative technologies capable of supporting the ambitious system requirements. To
this end, unprecedentedly high targets were set for the 5G system design, such as
seamless wide-area coverage (with 100 Mbps user rate) and extremely high-capacity
hot-spot access (1 to around 10 Gbps user rate). Among the candidate 5G tech-
nologies, direct device-to-device (D2D) communications attracts an increased re-
search attention [2] as it promises to deliver improved throughputs, provide more
efficient spatial reuse, lead to extended network coverage, and enhance user energy
efficiency. Broadly, D2D communications refers to a radio technology that enables
devices to communicate directly with each other, that is, without routing the data
paths through a network infrastructure.
With the widespread adoption of D2D communications, we expect the user devices to
take a more active part in 5G service provisioning and, in some cases (e.g., in partial
coverage situations), even assume some of the roles of the network infrastructure.
In particular, they can aid in providing wireless connectivity such as offering D2D-
based data relaying, proximity gaming, content distribution and caching, and other
forms of cooperative communications. This paradigm shift from the conventional
cellular model is driven by the natural progress in communications technologies: the
user devices are decisively augmenting their capabilities, whereas the base stations
(BSs) are becoming smaller as a result of the ongoing network densification [3].
Consequently, the original functional disparity between these key components of the
maturing 5G ecosystem – the user equipment (UE) and the BS infrastructure – is
gradually becoming blurred.
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However, there remains a fundamental difference between the UE and the BS, which
is rooted in the ownership rights of the corresponding equipment. Hence, cellular
operators may become interested in employing user devices as an important asset
in their networks, to benefit from their improved computational power, storage and
caching capacity, wireless access and sensing capability, as well as efficient support
for proximity services. Accordingly, adequate sources of motivation that facilitate
the end-user decisions to lend their personal devices for the collective tasks need
to be involved. In return, to compensate for the corresponding reduction in the
networking and computation power actually available to the individual user, more
powerful network assistance protocols will have to be developed – guiding the UE
toward the best opportunities to receive its desired service (e.g., user-in-the-loop [4]
and similar concepts). This rationale brings into focus the role that social relations
and interactions between an individual human user and its proximate neighbors may
play in supporting the maturing D2D communications paradigm.
In the past, community-centric incentives were exploited frequently, which meant
agreeing to engage into direct connectivity to cooperate with other like-minded in-
dividuals in certain well-defined scenarios (such as a conference, concert, sports
match, etc.). However, in order for this solution to scale to network-wide appli-
cations, operator-driven incentive mechanisms are strongly demanded. These may
e.g., be based on dynamic pricing techniques, as has been proposed in [5]. Indeed,
recent D2D-centric studies are already exploring benefits from the integration of
social and communications domains [6], but most existing work implicitly assumes
that all the users are equally likely to cooperate and share data. However, this is
not the case in practice as users acquire and own digital content based on their
individual interests and may not be willing to expose it unless trust is established
with the D2D partner. As a result, the main motivation behind this research is a
possibility to construct a 5G-grade secure D2D connectivity environment featuring
both reliable (infrastructure) and intermittent (out-of-coverage) device interactions.
The main goals of this work are as following. The author aims to provide a reli-
able connection establishment control algorithm; an adaptive mechanism for rapid
response to network topology changes or node failures; and an algorithm enabling
continuous secure connectivity even when the cellular base station is not accessible.
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The thesis is organized as follows. The author firstly presents a technological
overview of the network-assisted technology and the corresponding challenges in
Chapter 2. The background Chapter 3 provides insight into intermittent connectiv-
ity issues within the modern cellular networks and justifies our choices in terms of
protocol design. After that in Chapter 4 we formally define the information security
mechanism allowing continuous support for secure direct group communications.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the performance evaluation study utilizing system-level
simulations as well as discusses the corresponding results. Next, in Chapter 6 the
implementation of the proposed mechanism in live LTE core is presented. Chap-
ter 7 sheds light on future applications of the direct network-assisted communications
and on the standardization aspects of the previously discussed approaches. The last
Chapter concludes this thesis work.
42. TECHNOLOGY AND MOTIVATION
Currently, the lion’s share of the expected mobile traffic growth comes from peer-
to-peer (P2P) services that naturally involve clients in close proximity [7, 8] (see
Figure 2.1). The potential proximity-based communications also enable shorter and
lower-to-the-ground radio links without the cost of additional infrastructure. Hence,
whenever possible, neighboring client devices will use their direct connectivity ca-
pabilities, instead of infrastructure (cellular) links. Consequently, D2D connections
are anticipated to become an effective solution that would unlock substantial gains
in capacity and relieve congestion [9] on the way to 5G mobile networks. For mobile
network operators, D2D connectivity is becoming vital to enable traffic oﬄoading
from the core network and to realize efficient support of social networking through
device localization.
Cellular base station
Coverage area
Public safetyservice
Content sharing
Vehicularcommunication
Wearables
Industrial automation
Direct communication
Infrastructure communication
Emergency communication
Direct user link
Smart home 
Smart parking 
Public transport
Local advertising Proximal communication
High-density environment
Figure 2.1 Contemporary vision of proximal scenarios over D2D
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Fundamentally, proximity of user devices promises higher data rates, lower transfer
delays, and better power efficiency [10]. More broadly, employing client devices
within the integral network infrastructure is envisioned as the logical next step
to improve spatial reuse towards the vision of 1000x capacity by the year 2020
in 5G systems. Consequently, over the past few years, D2D communications has
received significant attention, both in industry and academia, due to the growing
number of services and applications that could leverage the proximity benefits. The
prospective applications of D2D connectivity in cellular networks are numerous (see
Figure 2.1) and include, to name a few, local voice service (oﬄoading calls between
proximate users), multimedia content sharing, gaming, group multicast, context-
aware applications, as well as public safety and national security.
Over the last decade, much research effort has been invested into the characterization
of D2D connections as part of LTE cellular technology by 3GPP in licensed bands,
where a license grants a network operator the right to use spectrum exclusively.
Driven by a wealth of potential practical applications, the concept of D2D commu-
nications as an underlay to a cellular network has been developed by the seminal
work in [11] and numerous subsequent papers. As in cognitive radio, D2D underlay
is operating on the same resources as the cellular network and D2D users control
their transmit power to suppress the resultant interference to the cellular users.
Given its growing importance, the licensed-band D2D is becoming an attractive re-
search area, where many fundamental questions still remain open. However, the
corresponding standardization efforts are developing slowly, such that the respective
products employing the D2D underlay may not be the first to meet the market.
Alternatively, unlicensed bands can be used freely, which gives opportunity to lever-
age D2D benefits almost immediately. While there already exists a plethora of
unlicensed spectrum protocols to technically enable direct connectivity, there is nei-
ther centralized control of radio resources to manage QoS on D2D links nor is there
any scalable device discovery solution [12]. Augmenting the current technology, the
author envisions that devices be continually associated with the cellular network
and use this connectivity to control their D2D connections in unlicensed bands.
Therefore, in the near-term it is expected that the majority of gains will come
from advanced network-assisted D2D architectures and protocols that would lever-
age the unlicensed spectrum.
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2.1 Research background
Today, assisted proximal communications constitutes a radical innovation and thus
becomes an exciting new area of investigation. Not surprisingly, researchers from
different branches of science are flocking into this space, bringing an avalanche of
recent publications on various aspects of direct connectivity. However, the true D2D
technology is very different from the past concepts of delay- and disruption-tolerant
networks, mobile ad hoc network (MANETs), as well as sensor and mesh networks
in that it assumes a certain degree of cellular network assistance, coordination, or
control of otherwise distributed proximal communication.
As discussed above, there are two distinct flavors of D2D technology: one currently
available in unlicensed (e.g., ISM) bands, named out-of-band, and another standard-
ized as a 4G add-on in licensed (e.g., cellular) spectrum, named in-band. Further,
in-band D2D can be implemented as underlay (when D2D transmitters opportunis-
tically access time-frequency resources occupied by cellular users) [13] or overlay
(when cellular and D2D transmitters use orthogonal time-frequency resources) [14].
In what follows, the state-of-the-art along these lines is summarized.
2.1.1 Option A: in-band D2D in cellular networks
For more than 5 billion cellular clients registered today, network-assisted D2D com-
munications is becoming a natural next step to achieve enhanced resource utilization
as the traditional methods to improve the use of licensed spectrum approach their
theoretical limits. Consequently, there has already been some coverage in literature
on direct user connectivity with different levels of network involvement ranging from
the minimal degrees of assistance (such as in Aura-net/FlashLinQ) [15] to the fully
controlled solutions (such as in cellular underlay) [11]. The latter is naturally more
challenging and generally requires interference control to enable simultaneous di-
rect links [16].
For the D2D underlay/overlay to work, the network should employ proper admission
and power control on D2D transmitters as well as allocate radio resource to them.
As a result, D2D links may (i) reuse resources reserved for cellular use, (ii) use free
resources not allocated for cellular use, or (iii) relay traffic through the infrastruc-
ture network avoiding direct transmissions. The choice between these alternatives
is known as transmission mode selection [17] and has attracted many researchers
2.1. Research background 7
focusing on various optimization targets, from signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) and throughput to energy efficiency [18], data delay, fairness, and outage
probability [19]. The general difference between existing works is in the considered
numbers of communicating entities of each type (base stations, cellular and D2D
users), emphasis on uplink (UL) or downlink (DL) connection and the resulting
interference, orthogonal vs. non-orthogonal resource sharing, degree of available
network assistance, and network/D2D duplexing mode.
In summary, the existing design and development efforts have been mostly based
on static system-level simulations, whereas academic research has been focusing on
simpler (and often even simplistic) system models to maintain analytical tractabil-
ity. Some aspects of licensed spectrum D2D have indeed been evaluated, includ-
ing the design of D2D-aware multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) schemes,
application of network coding [20], successive interference cancellation, and even
wireless video distribution over D2D [21]. As a result, 3GPP member companies
are currently pushing for the standardization of D2D communications over licensed
bands [22]. A major breakthrough was achieved in due course when 3GPP (in LTE
Rel.-12) agreed on completing an assignment for D2D technology focusing primarily
on proximity detection for public safety (known as 3GPP ProSe) [23]. As the result,
D2D appears today as a 4G feature with very limited performance potential and
much further work is required to having a D2D dimension natively supported in 5G
(a.k.a. LTE-Direct). Meanwhile, as many important research challenges still remain
open, the use of unlicensed spectrum for D2D is becoming an attractive immedi-
ate alternative.
2.1.2 Option B: leveraging out-of-band opportunities for D2D
In unlicensed spectrum, such as the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) bands,
no network may take advantage of exclusive spectrum usage. This results in un-
controlled wireless interference and lack of global synchronization, which requires a
robust interference-proof solution. In the past, legacy Bluetooth and WiFi technolo-
gies have become increasingly widespread among users to organize wireless personal
and local area networks respectively. Based on IEEE 802.11 standards, WiFi is
currently a predominant choice for user device connectivity both with and without
involving the infrastructure APs. Since it operates over shorter links and higher
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frequencies, it achieves better levels of spatial reuse than 3GPP LTE. Hence, even
poor WiFi link generally delivers higher data rate and energy efficiency than any
today’s cellular technology.
Importantly, the current WLAN technologies running on the unlicensed bands can
be made to cause very little interference to LTE networks. But while this makes the
use of WiFi an excellent choice for the network, this may not always be the case for
the client. For example, WiFi connectivity lacks a fast and resource efficient way
of notifying clients when/if they are in D2D range. Hence, if a user is searching
for a particular peer who is out of range for a long period of time, it will suffer
significant battery drain. Therefore, the QoS performance of uncoordinated short-
range technologies may be limited by the lack of centralized management, which
could otherwise facilitate peer discovery and medium access [24].
In other words, in conventional WLANs, the AP has no measures to control the
resources used by ad hoc user connections, which contend for the same channel.
This is where the LTE network can be of much help. If clients are continuously con-
nected to the LTE network, it knows which cell(s) they are associated with, which
tracking area(s) they are in, and their locations within a few meters (if location ser-
vices are enabled). Therefore, the network can quickly and without significant over-
head determine if/when clients are potentially within D2D range and inform them
accordingly. Additionally, network assistance can help with mode selection [25],
power control [26], and selecting transmission format (modulation and coding rates,
MIMO transmission mode, etc.) [27]. Finally, with recent and emerging 802.11 pro-
tocols, such as WiFi-Direct (for infrastructure-less communications in ISM bands),
802.11ad (for data transmission in mmWave frequencies at extremely high rates),
and 802.11ah (for machine-type communications in sub-1GHz spectrum at very low
power), assisted out-of-band D2D connectivity holds a significant promise for further
investigation.
2.2 Open challenges
In the remainder of this text, the author of this thesis outlines the currently open
research challenges in the context of network-assisted proximal communication, solv-
ing which may eventually convert this promising technology into a new commodity
for both network operators and end clients.
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Challenge 1: proposing adequate D2D-aware scenarios
We expect that assisted proximal communications will become of high benefit in
congested locations (e.g., office buildings, shopping malls, hotspots, airports, and
public events) characterized by high daily densities of users, who may employ D2D
and cellular links concurrently (see Figure 2.1) [28]. In existing research literature,
however, the target D2D use cases are often selected arbitrarily and artificially,
whereas standardization bodies have paid so far very limited attention to the entire
palette of prospective D2D-inspired applications. In particular, past 3GPP Rel.-12
work has only been focused on public safety/national security domain [29] as well
as on neighboring device/service discovery for commercial use. Hence, a fresh look
is required to identify comprehensive available set of proximal scenarios.
Further, the envisioned D2D scenarios have to be distributed across the charac-
teristic application categories, such as mobile proximity-based social networks; di-
rect communications and oﬄoading between smartphones, tablets, and laptops; e-
commerce and location-based advertising; high-speed vehicular networks; machine-
type communication; wearables; public safety (first responders), etc. Each such
distinct area, in turn, has a number of alternative radio access technologies (RATs)
that are (or will soon become) available in the respective market niche; and the
research community might want to map each of these application areas onto the
relevant subset of RATs. Finally, for every such area with its associated RATs, the
major research questions have to be identified both from the mobile operator and
the end user perspectives (which may have conflicting objectives). These questions
could be formulated in terms of typical performance metrics (user data rate, energy
efficiency, latency, network/area capacity, coverage probability, SINR distribution,
etc.). In particular, special attention has to be paid to environment dynamics (traf-
fic variability, user mobility, wireless channel fluctuations, etc.), which has not been
adequately covered by the past literature.
Challenge 2: developing D2D-centric system architecture
Historically, existing wireless architectures had very limited coordination between
different radio access network (RAN) types. For example, 3GPP (cellular) and WiFi
(WLAN/IEEE 802.11) technologies had developed independently in the past, but
recently the standards community has recognized the need for breaking this long-
accepted paradigm. To this end, a range of RAT interworking methods has emerged,
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from loose application-layer coupling and core network based coordination functions
to the latest RAN-level integration options ratified in Rel.-12 LTE (and continued
in Rel.-13). With tighter RAN-level coupling, the 3GPP and WLAN technologies
may in principle interwork more dynamically. Hence, the author is confident that
some forms of LTE-assisted WiFi D2D solutions may be useful in practical networks
almost immediately [30], as contemporary handheld devices can already operate over
D2D links in unlicensed bands. However, much additional work needs to be done
along the lines of adding improved network assistance logic due to the rapid advent
of (relatively) novel and emerging 802.11 technologies, such as WiFi-Direct, WiGig
(802.11ad), and low-power WiFi (802.11ah).
Complementary to the above, the perspective of offering in-band D2D communica-
tions option (i.e., LTE-Direct) delivers even tighter synchronization between the de-
vices, allows leveraging more advanced security procedures and transmission modes,
and thus generally promises higher gains to both operators and clients (capacity and
reuse factors, peak rates and latency, coverage extension, etc.) [31]. However, the
respective progress in 3GPP is slow due to disjoint opinions and conflicting busi-
ness strategies of the involved member companies. To this end, LTE Rel.-12 has
only studied so far system requirements for D2D, as well as proposed simple ar-
chitecture and physical-layer enhancements (see the corresponding 3GPP technical
reports [32], [33], and [34]). This 3GPP work, while being a dramatic departure
from infrastructure-only cellular communications paradigm, still requires significant
effort to make LTE-Direct reality [35]. In particular, appropriate lightweight sig-
naling and UL/DL duplexing frame structures have to be developed to integrate
efficient support for direct-mode LTE [36]. This is especially important as LTE of-
fers higher degrees of freedom in D2D mode selection, as well as potentially offers
more fine-grained control over D2D pairing and subsequent communication.
Additional areas of research with respect to D2D system architecture include cou-
pling direct-mode communications with (massive) MIMO schemes and other multi-
antenna techniques [13], as well as harnessing mmWave frequencies for D2D connec-
tivity with their associated unique challenge of highly directional transmissions [37].
More attention will be needed to learn the feasible levels of network assistance
information (in terms of control protocol overheads), from user locations, channel
knowledge, and network loading/interference factors, and up to expected user inten-
tions (such as in emerging user-in-the-loop studies [38]). This, in turn, will require
proper accounting for numerous real-world factors that are expected to influence the
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performance of practical D2D deployments, such as actual traffic arrival patterns,
user mobility behavior, air interface considerations, tight coupling between commu-
nicating devices and collocated access technologies, application service requirements,
fine-grained channel degradation factors, etc. Ultimately, with the support from the
cellular network, the author expects that D2D connectivity can be automated, and
devices may enjoy D2D benefits anytime/anywhere without considerable human user
involvement.
Challenge 3: designing efficient D2D operation mechanisms
In tight connection with proximity-aware network-assisted architecture work goes
development of feasible D2D mechanisms at all stages of the process in question:
device/service discovery, connection setup, and data communication. Improved de-
vice awareness alone, achieved with always-on proximal discovery, is expected to
decisively augment the networks of today and eventually transform into the digi-
tal sixth sense [39]. Here, research is necessary on proposing improved discovery
schemes [40], which would be superior to past similar location- and beacon-based
methods (e.g., in IrDA, Bluetooth, as well as in conventional WiFi ad-hoc, WiFi-
Direct, and cellular technologies). More generally, the forthcoming work includes
redesigning the conventional network control functions for D2D [41], [42]: resource
allocation, power control, interference coordination, seamless handover, etc., as well
as proposing new schemes for e.g., mode selection and cooperative client relay [43].
To facilitate this study, our research group has recently built an advanced system-
level simulator (SLS) based on up-to-date 3GPP LTE evaluation methodology and
current IEEE 802.11 specifications. Today, neither free nor commercially-available
simulation tools are readily applicable for developing D2D protocols as they are
missing the necessary features, as well as lacking scalability to adequately capture
the dependencies between the studied variables. By contrast, our SLS is a flexi-
ble tool targeted to support diverse deployment strategies, traffic models, channel
characteristics, and wireless protocols [44].
The next natural step after the relevant D2D mechanisms have been delivered is
to tailor them to the envisioned dense deployments [45], [28]. While there have
been concerns that the quality of D2D connections may not be sufficient for higher
user/infrastructure densities, our preliminary results indicate that the correspond-
ing performance improvement is significant even with very simple forms of network
assistance [46]. However, further work is necessary on D2D-aware radio resource
2.2. Open challenges 12
allocation and management (transmit power and neighbor/mode selection); inter-
ference coordination/cancellation and advanced receivers (where network manages
the number and the selection of simultaneous D2D transmitters); efficient spectrum
sharing (licensed vs. unlicensed); delay- and traffic-aware resource management [47].
Of particular interest are D2D-aided point-to-multipoint (multicasting) transmis-
sion schemes [48], [49] with appropriate device grouping (to optimize the respective
choice of modulation and coding schemes) [50], [51]. Most importantly, a character-
istic feature of ultra-dense networks is that occasionally they may be substantially
underutilized (due to high variations in current loading), whereas conventional cel-
lular networks are generally expected to soon meet their capacity limits. However,
given the associated complexity, dynamic systems have not been studied as broadly
as their static counterparts with a fixed set of active users. Consequently, our pro-
posed future focus is on properly and explicitly accounting for said variability in
user, traffic, and environment dynamics.
Finally, to conclude work on the D2D-specific control schemes, the promising se-
lected mechanisms have to be converted into actual real-life 5G-grade direct proto-
cols. This work includes careful design of appropriate signaling patterns and their
respective optimization [52]. As an example, community needs to develop robust
low-complexity procedures for D2D mode selection, which allow potential D2D part-
ners to efficiently choose between silent, non-orthogonal sharing, orthogonal sharing,
and cellular transmission regimes. While there is a challenge in that the resulting
utility function for the general case may turn out to be overly-complex (or even
intractable), the author of this thesis is confident that it would be possible to in-
dicate feasible near-optimal (approximate) solutions with reasonable mathematical
tractability [53]. These solutions will reveal the guiding design principles to deal with
imperfect (non-ideal) control channels (e.g., capacity-limited, delayed, and with un-
reliable signaling). This, in turn, should allow for assessing the extent of minimal
signaling overheads for efficient D2D operation, as well as effectively balance the
developed intelligence between the users and the network.
Challenge 4: performance evaluation of D2D solutions
As it was presented previously, the development of adequate D2D operation mech-
anisms comes with its unique challenges, such as dual user mobility, low antenna
heights, and high inter-link correlation. Therefore, a diversity of methods has to
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be applied to assess the performance of perspective D2D-centric mechanisms. To-
day, known D2D performance evaluation works are based on (non-)cooperative,
coalitional, and evolutionary game theory [54], [55] direct numerical analysis, graph
theory [56], as well as simple forms of stochastic geometry [57] (that is, statistical
modeling of spatial relationships) and utility maximization. However, these ap-
proaches are mostly restricted to (semi-)static D2D system topologies and/or may
introduce prohibitive complexity for subsequent real-time implementation. In sharp
contrast, the author proposes to adopt a range of random spatial models, where
user locations are drawn from a particular realization of a random process, and
then integrate them with appropriate flow-level dynamic frameworks [58]. Coupling
such topological randomness with system dynamics introduces a fundamental dif-
ference in characterizing user signal power and interference, dynamic load modeling
(e.g., streaming traffic vs. bursty files), handovers, etc. The group has already made
progress along these lines [30] and possess preliminary results that demonstrate that
the locations of the network clients relative to each other highly impact the resulting
system performance [46].
Capitalizing on the methods proposed for D2D analysis, the research community
would need to develop further understanding behind the anticipated performance
of proximal communications on the system level, including coverage and capacity
projections (coverage probability, number of served users, their throughput, etc.),
as well as characterize spectral and energy efficiencies across the entire D2D deploy-
ment, its operational latency and reliability. In the absence of prior information
about user locations, the author began with the simplest statistical tool to model
user placement with a uniform distribution, which in the two-dimensional plane cor-
responds to a homogeneous (stationary) Poisson Point Process (PPP). This model is
surprisingly tractable and provides a reasonable first-order understanding of random
deployments [59], which then needs to be coupled with flow dynamics to achieve bet-
ter load balancing between e.g., voice vs. data. Then, the models in question could
be extended to more realistic, but also significantly more complex point processes,
such as binomial process spawning a fixed number of users in a given area and Pois-
son cluster process allowing transmitters to group in certain locations. Eventually,
it should become possible to attack the most challenging hard core point process
which is a thinning of the PPP such that the users have a guaranteed minimum
separation (due to e.g., excluding carrier-sensing range).
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To comprehensively conclude on the performance promise of proximal systems, re-
searchers need to build a general mathematical framework for assisted D2D connec-
tivity featuring the analysis of achievable area capacity regions and gains, advanced
interference mitigation approaches for simultaneous D2D pairs, benefits of single- vs.
multi-hop communication [60], and other new fundamental knowledge and methods.
More generally, studying the capacity of D2D-capable wireless networks remains an
open problem in the field of information theory, and in order to shed light on it our
need is to explicitly capture new interference situations and hence the achievable
data rates. This is indeed a very ambitious task as it requires advanced mathemat-
ical knowledge to interconnect and apply techniques and methods coming from the
area of point processes, probability theory, queuing theory, and percolation theory,
as well as modern engineering insights [61]. Another challenge is to account for high
mobility of potential D2D users, when direct connectivity graphs become extremely
unstable [56]. In addition, we also need to understand the added value of emerg-
ing new techniques for D2D, such as energy harvesting (especially for machine-type
devices), cognitive radio improvements, and interference randomization via time/fre-
quency hopping.
Challenge 5: leveraging available D2D benefits for operators
Utilizing the solutions to the above challenges, further work could be targeted at
a thorough characterization of dynamic cellular traffic oﬄoading onto the direct
links to relieve congestion in pre-5G deployments [62]. Many believe that this form
of oﬄoading will be preferred by mobile network operators at around 2020 due to
reduced operational and capital investments associated with D2D operation. The
author, proposes to address efficient data dissemination methods over D2D in coex-
istence with alternative forms of oﬄoading (WLAN-based, small cells, ultra-dense
heterogeneous networks, additional spectrum with LSA, and mmWave access) [63].
Naturally, depending on the client mobility patterns, some services are better suit-
able for proximity-based network oﬄoading than the others. For example, if D2D
partners are non-stationary, the quality of the link may change dramatically over
short periods of time, thus making it difficult to guarantee service. In these cases,
the best candidates for proximal oﬄoading are delay-tolerant services, i.e. those that
can be queued until the D2D link recovers or for which the data session can be moved
to the infrastructure network (e.g., video-on-demand or file transfers). However, if
both clients are (semi-)stationary, many other services, such as cooperative stream-
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ing and social gaming, can be oﬄoaded onto D2D links with good results. Further,
the author envisions massive performance gains for mobile network operators, that
will come from inter-cell load coordination for non-uniform user traffic (i.e., 1% of
clients generating around 10% of traffic [64]) in flow, space, and time [65]. Indeed,
it is well known that wireless capacity cannot generally be transferred (stored) in
time as well as it cannot be transferred (moved around) in space. However, several
alternative opportunistic approaches may be used to work around these fundamental
restrictions and arrive at more uniform network loading and ubiquitous space-time
service with minimal risks to the conventional network behaviour, which is much
desired by the operators today.
To aid early adoption of D2D communications by mobile network operators, the
appropriate incentive mechanisms would also need to be in place. These should
include novel D2D-aware pricing and billing schemes, which may encourage D2D-
based cooperation across the network. In tight connection with such schemes goes
user categorization into service classes (platinum, gold, silver, bronze, etc.) with
respective sets of guaranteed and best-effort services. Not only should this impact
the choice of network-wide resource allocation criteria, but also influence the user
admission procedures onto cellular vs. D2D tiers. Naturally, the densest packing
of D2D pairs should be catered for (a.k.a., maximal matching), such that the pre-
defined levels of quality of service/experience could be maintained (e.g., minimum
bitrate, latency, availability), mindful of the time required to perform such packing.
Our research group envisions that the field of integral geometry embodies applicable
methods, such as the notion of kinematic density, which will enable us to understand
the best available packing schemes of D2D pairs, when direct-mode communications
is employed. Ultimately, research work along the lines of this challenge should help
identify existing and offer new incentivized services over D2D together with appropri-
ate monetization opportunities for network and technology operators, as well as for
the over-the-top providers, to eventually enrich the entire 5G service ecosystem [66].
Challenge 6: leveraging available D2D benefits for clients
Complementary to the previous challenge, a look at the D2D solutions benefit-
ing network clients is required. Here, proximity-aware user-specific algorithms and
strategies are in prompt need, which are able to efficiently leverage direct connec-
tivity in emerging 5G networks, thus resulting in novel practices for end users. An
important challenge for individual users, as well as for connected mobile clouds,
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remains in the insufficient degrees of availability of user-desired content. Here, D2D
systems can be of much help by caching the most popular content locally in the
neighboring user devices [67], thus dramatically improving content availability and
bringing the service closer to the end user. Another interesting development is to
explicitly account for the end-user traffic activity [68] and shape it, which has re-
cently been named user-in-the-loop [38]. Indeed, as human users tend to exploit
more and more services and applications on their mobile devices, they are often left
frustrated when these do not work anytime/anywhere. Network operators are thus
forced to invest astonishing amounts (of up to $50 billion per year) into improving
their network infrastructure, but the seminal work in [38] proposes an attractive
alternative by actually impacting user-generated traffic, which could be investigated
further for D2D systems.
Finally, a set of security-related challenges is arising, as user adoption is inherently
intertwined with the sense of security, privacy, and trust towards a particular service
or application. Hence, the community needs to address the coexistence of closed vs.
open access groups [69], especially in the cases of partial/no network coverage [70]
(edge of a cell, network failure, malicious attack, etc.), and offer provable security
and privacy mechanisms for such novel scenarios.
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3. SECURING INTERMITTENT
CONNECTIVITY
In today’s cellular networks, the central control infrastructure that orchestrates the
associated wireless devices is deemed always available [71]. Consequently, given its
reliable and ubiquitous presence, cellular network is typically assumed to serve as
a trusted authority for security purposes. In proximity-based D2D communications
with continuous cellular connectivity, the 3GPP LTE base station is responsible
for managing security functions within the network, and most of the corresponding
operations can thus be handled over the PKI [72].
3.1 Cellular networks of today
For wireless architectures not relying on pre-existing network infrastructure [73, 74],
communications and security functions are distributed across users. If simultaneous
use of more than one radio interface is allowed, a variety of new attacks [75, 76]
become possible, which advocates the use of PKI whenever available.
The key requirements for hybrid systems without permanent centralized manage-
ment can be identified as follows [77]: a reliable connection establishment control
algorithm; an adaptive mechanism for rapid response to network topology changes
or node failures; a multi-hop communications possibility; and an algorithm en-
abling continuous secure connectivity even when the cellular base station is
not accessible. This important topic is elaborated upon in what follows.
Currently, the research area of secure proximity-based connectivity is being estab-
lished from the optimal resources allocation [78], key redistribution [79], and physi-
cal security [80] perspectives. Importantly, the suggested protocol to allow secured
direct interconnection in combined cellular/WiFi networks would require a strong
response from industry. This fact is due to the complexity of its implementation
and standardization processes.
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Before proceeding with the associated background, the author of this work discusses
the main underlying terms and definitions. First, a security protocol is assumed to
be composed of distinct blocks, which in essence constitute various cryptographic
primitives constructed by the protocol developer or reused from the past research.
Each of these primitives solves a certain specific security issue. Some fundamental
primitives and their associated descriptions are the following:
• Confidentiality (Encryption) – only authorized users have access to the data
transmitted over a wireless network.
• Integrity (Hash functions) – only authorized users can alter the transmitted
data.
• Accessibility (Keys, Passphrases) – only authorized users can access the data
in a timely fashion within operational constraints.
As a result, relevant primitives are combined in order to construct a required protocol
that would solve a certain target task. In particular, important research questions
to address when developing the protocol are: What to combine? How to connect?
In which order?
3.2 Secure connectivity for unfamiliar devices
This section concentrates on the key security challenges from the point of view of
establishing secure connectivity between unfamiliar proximal devices. Even though
our problem formulation is novel and shaped by the emerging network-assisted D2D
technology, the topic itself has much prior background captured e.g., in [81, 82],
and [83]. For instance, the well-known Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [84]
maintains the zero-knowledge property on each side of communication, but requires
a secure channel in-between the communicating parties for its successful operation.
Taking into account the more recent developments, PKI is employed as a trusted
authority (i.e., a certificate provider) to distribute public keys and by this means al-
lowing the communications for end-devices [72]. A simplified PKI scheme is depicted
in Figure 3.1.
Alternatively, if the network in question does not feature a centralized control unit, a
Pair-Wise Key (PWK) could be utilized [85]. Importantly, while using this method
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Figure 3.1 Secure data transmission with and without the PKI
the communicating devices would not be able to obtain any information about their
pair devices except for their identity. Hence, one would need to use ID-based cryp-
tography [86] and verify the device’s signature – a public key based on a specific
ID. However, a personal secret key is then required for decryption. The respective
service may be provided with the use of a Private Key Generator (PKG), which
could be employed only in the case of its availability in the system.
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Figure 3.2 Keys (pair-wise) redistribution and new user arrival case
Additionally, if a PKG becomes temporarily unreachable, a set of users connected to
the PKG prior to when the connection became unavailable could group together and
form a (or use an existing) Master Key (MK) [87], [88]. Accordingly, a new device
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could receive access to the network as it is shown in Figure 3.2. A new PWK could
be generated as a function of the MK and a set of IDs (Fi,j = F (MK, IDi, IDj)).
Interestingly, in sensor networks the devices conventionally remove the MK after
the key pair generation has been completed [89]. Such course of operation is taken
mainly due to the static system topology of most sensor networks. Along these lines,
in our D2D architecture we reuse this approach in order to allow for the new devices
to join the network continuously, even if the cellular network connection becomes
unreachable. Additionally, the MK would be regenerated anew in case when the
base station connection is re-established.
Noteworthy, the devices may also store a PWK with themselves Fi,i. This is done
mainly for the case when a new user enters their proximity, that is, when the target
device is connected to the cellular network and it requests a MK directly from the
network coordinator to obtain a new key and connect to the neighboring device
K1,j = K1,1 = F (MK, ID1, ID1).
Another important issue in proximity-based networks is the question of trust. In
this thesis, the author considers a solution based on Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
trust scheme developed by Phil Zimmermann [90]. Accordingly, the trust level can
be input as a numeral from zero to one and would then be obtained as a sum of
the trust multiplications for the already known users t = w01w11 + w02w12, as it is
demonstrated in Figure 3.3. Hence, if the trust level is equal or greater than 1, one
can assume that the user is trusted; otherwise, the connection to this user would be
discarded. In addition, one may build a tree of trust for the target network.
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Figure 3.3 Trust policy based on PGP scheme
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The second part of our discussion concerns classical issues related to ad-hoc net-
works [91], that is, proximity-based device arrival/departure when no connection to
the centralized infrastructure is available. Importantly, this scenario brings along
additional challenges, such as key distribution for device association. The latter can
be solved by a Broadcast Encryption Protocol [92], which implies that there exists a
number of user key sets K = K1, K2, ..., Kn, where |Ki| > 1,∪Ki = K, |Ki∩Kj| > 1.
In turn, for the key construction one may use Cover Free Families (CFF) – a special-
ized system of sets having the alphabet of elements X and a set of subsets (blocks)
F (X). An example of CFF is shown in Figure 3.4. Correspondingly, a system can
be defined as a CFF, if for any block B0 ∈ B and any other r blocks A1; ...;An ∈ B,
one can calculate B0 =
r⋃
j=1
Aj,= where |X| = T is the alphabet size, |B0| = N is
the number of blocks, r is the number of blocks, which do not cover any other block,
and n is the block length.
As different users should have a possibility to obtain their key, there may appear a
situation when a small set of users can produce the key with less inter-operation.
Hence, the respective attack may be conducted by a certain group of devices. On
the other hand, by using this approach one can guarantee that if the number of
devices is less or equal than the minimum number of needed devices for the key
reconstruction I, this group would not cover a key of any other device.
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Figure 3.4 Cover-free family r = 2, n = 6, and T = 30
In summary, for our problem at hand one may employ sharing schemes based on
well-known solutions, such as: Chinese remainder theorem [93]; Lagrange polyno-
mial interpolation [94]; Error-correcting codes (Reed-Solomon codes) [95]. Providing
continuous secure connectivity with the above solution should become a significant
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improvement in next-generation D2D systems. Here, the Lagrange polynomial mech-
anism may be preferred due to its relative computational simplicity, which is one
of the crucial factors for today’s mobile devices. A classical formulation assumes
that every communicating device (representing its user) is fairly equal and has the
same weight of its vote (or share) in the overall trust tree. However, a situation
may appear when one would like to vary weights and focus the discussed solution
on the trust enforcement in more complex systems. Therefore, one would need to
sign the data before transmitting it and employ the secret sharing schemes, which
distribute the key shares between the devices. The following list is surveying the
currently available democratic solutions [96]:
• (1,n) scheme – any individual device share can recover the secret key (shown
in Figure 3.5a).
• (n,n) scheme – only all n shares from n devices can recover the secret key
(shown in Figure 3.5b).
• (k,n) scheme – any k of n shares can recover the secret key. If the number
of shares is less than k, then the key may not be recovered (shown in Figure
3.5c). This mechanism is chosen to be used in our implementation discussed
below.
• weighted (k,n) scheme – participants with the weight sum of equal to or more
than k can recover the secret key. The weighs may vary based on the level of
trust (shown in Figure 3.5d).
In addition to the above, it is important to take into account the well-known dictator-
ship solutions [97]. The main difference between these and the previously discussed
democratic approaches is in that one or more “significant” devices should participate
in the key recovery process, and in case none has participated the key should not be
recovered. More specifically, we assume that the secret is a codeword a of the Web
Host Manager code [98], an encrypted secret is b = a+ e, and the shares are the val-
ues and positions of possible fixed errors. Hence, the secret reconstruction process is
essentially error correction at known positions of b. If the sum weight of uncorrected
errors is less than the threshold value t, then the secret can be reconstructed by the
decoding procedure.
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Figure 3.5 Examples of secret sharing schemes
Further, the proximity-based D2D system may be improved by employing the McEliece
scheme for error-correcting codes [99]. Here, the secret keys for the security classes
are chosen by means of using the embedded codes. Hence, each device has its own
private key and no additional information on this specific device is sent in the en-
crypted message. Noteworthy, there is an opportunity to exchange messages on all
levels of hierarchy, that is, in-between the classes.
In summary, the considered D2D system operation may look similar to that of ad
hoc networks, but it also has one key difference – in a D2D scenario all the commu-
nicating devices are (have been) associated with the cellular base station, at least
for some time, which would be sufficient to distribute the initial amount of security-
related information (master keys, certificates, etc.). Hence, classical decentralized
security-centric solutions (for e.g., sensor networks) may be significantly augmented
in the D2D case by utilizing the possibility to (periodically) access the trusted cel-
lular infrastructure.
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4. INFORMATION SECURITY MECHANISM
Many contemporary mobile devices have several available short-range radio inter-
faces (WiFi, BLE, etc.) as well as employ cellular connection (e.g., 3GPP LTE)
for most of their operation time. Hence, regular functioning of network-assisted
D2D communications assumes that the cellular base station controls direct trans-
missions between devices (e.g., over WiFi-Direct) in all respects, including security,
through the active cellular connection. However, if this cellular link is (temporarily)
unavailable, secure communications may be disrupted and admission/exclusion of
users to/from secure communications groups is not possible any longer. Taking ad-
vantage of the above background, below the author proposes a novel mechanism to
extend the secure D2D operation for the cases of intermittent cellular connectivity.
—No cellular connection 
—Request to join coalition
—Blank device
—Light device
—Dark device
—Device in coalition
Figure 4.1 Example scenario with unreliable cellular connectivity
The target scenario (see Figure 4.1) considers all of the involved devices to be
multi-radio terminals (at least with LTE and WiFi interfaces) that initially have
been connected to the cellular network, which acts as their trusted authority for the
purposes of the certificate distribution. Further, it is assumed that all of the devices
under consideration participate in assisted oﬄoading of their cellular data flows onto
WiFi-Direct sessions [64], thus the cellular link is only taken into consideration for
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transferring the signaling information. This link is employed by the D2D users in
proximity to communicate with the PKI functions and establish a coalition, that is,
a logical group of securely-commutating devices.
In this work, the author argues that whenever the reliable cellular link becomes un-
available for some of the devices in a coalition, additional measures are necessary to
continue secure operation (communication, new user admission, user exclusion, etc.).
Therefore, the author proposes the following classification to conveniently differen-
tiate between the various types of users (see Figure 4.1) from the point of view of
this research:
• “Light” device that has a reliable cellular connection active;
• “Dark” device that currently does not have a reliable cellular connection, but
used to have such form of connectivity in the past;
• “Blank” (unknown) device that wishes to join the secure coalition. Importantly,
such device may not have had access to the cellular network (and its respective
trusted authority) previously.
To this end, the author of this thesis further specifies the following functions of the
target algorithm to enable secure D2D communications in case of unreliable cellular
connectivity.
Join coalition In case when a device wishes to join a secure coalition, the latter
may be done in two alternative ways, depending on the availability of the cellular
connection. If it is available, all the respective functions would be managed by the
trusted authority residing in the cellular operator’s network. The existing signaling
mechanisms would then process the device’s request straightforwardly by allowing
to obtain its own certificate signed by the coalition owner. Alternatively, in case
of unreliable cellular link, the device would send its request to any of its proximate
users in the target coalition, which would then utilize the developed cryptographic
methods, such as new user secret generation, certificates redistribution, etc. The
coalition acceptance decision for this requesting device is made collectively, i.e.,
when k out of N devices in a coalition grant access to the new user based on their
shares. Noteworthy, after the cellular connection is re-established for the new user,
its inclusion into the coalition would be transparent for the trusted authority, as its
secret is kept unchanged.
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Leave coalition At some point, a device may decide to leave its current coalition
due to mobility (i.e., leaving proximity) or other factors. This work considers the
case of device exclusion and again different procedures could be applied. On the
one hand, if the device in question has a reliable connection to the cellular network,
which knows about its geographic position change, an automated decision can be
made and user certificates for this specific coalition would be revoked. On the other
hand, if there is no reliable cellular connectivity for this device, the decision should
be made employing our proposed weight-based mechanism.
Coalition initialization Another important challenge is the initial device grouping.
Again, for a system with persistent cellular connection, the devices can rely on the
solutions from past literature. However, if not all of the devices involved into direct
communications have a reliable cellular link, we need to reconsider the trust and
privacy policies along the lines of this proposal.
Coalition recovery As defined before, the coalition is a logical group of devices with
their own set of certificates. Hence, the dedicated measures are required to control
the overall system stability in case when a coalition member misbehaves or comes
into proximity of another already established coalition. Of particular interest are
the situations when not all of the devices in the coalition have a reliable cellular
connection available. In these situations, a modification of Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change procedure may be employed, followed by the challenge of introducing such a
“remote” coalition to the cellular trusted authority.
Having described the most essential functions of the proposed algorithm on the
general level, we can now proceed with discussing its actual implementation.
4.1 Securing direct communications
Although the D2D system operation may, at first glance, appear similar to that of
ad hoc networks, there is one key difference allowing to relax numerous restrictive
assumptions related to “pure” ad hoc topologies. In case of cellular-assisted D2D
connectivity, all the communicating devices are also associated with the cellular BS,
at least for some time. The BS thus facilitates the distribution of initial security-
related information. Hence, classical decentralized security-centric solutions (for e.g.,
sensor networks) may be significantly augmented in the D2D scenarios by utilizing
the possibility to (periodically) access the trusted cellular infrastructure.
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When designing our security solution, the author assumes that the cellular network
coverage is imperfect and sometimes users can face situations of unreliable cellular
connectivity due to natural obstacles, tunnels, planes, or other issues. However,
while using proximity-based services, such as games, file sharing, and data exchange,
the users are assumed to have continuous support for those applications over a
secure channel. In order to understand what kind of new functionality is needed for
the discussed security procedures, consider the connectivity cases demonstrated in
Figure 4.2 in more detail. All of the possible scenarios that may appear in a network-
assisted D2D system can in principle be reduced to the four cases discussed below.
Figure 4.2 Available D2D system operation modes
• Case 1. Here, the grouped together users A and B have already established
their own secure group (i.e., coalition) based on their area of interest and using
the cellular connection to the operator’s network, the application server, and
the PKI. The coalition secret has already been generated at the server side,
and the users have all received the corresponding credentials and certificates of
each other – they remain connected to the cellular network that orchestrates
their data exchange. As a result, the data flows are running over cellular links
due to the absence of proximity between the devices.
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• Case 2. Here, the author focuses on another set of devices consisting of C and
D, as well as E that all have already established a coalition. Then, a heavy
data flow may be running on the direct link between the devices and does
not affect the cellular network capacity. All the needed information security
procedures for the coalition establishment and key exchange are performed
similarly to Case 1.
• Case 3. In this case, the coalition does not have an active connection to the
cellular network. Hence, all the required key generation and distribution pro-
cedures are conducted over the direct D2D connections, by contrast to the
previous cases. These procedures require higher involvement of the partici-
pating devices. The coalition secret is kept unchanged until when the tagged
group of the devices regains cellular network coverage.
• Case 4. In this case, the users are neither in the cellular coverage nor have a
possibility to communicate directly. As a result, no security algorithm needs to
be executed and users are waiting for the cellular coverage or direct connection
to (re)appear.
4.2 Proposed information security procedures
For the purposes of the proposed security protocol, it is assumed that the cellular
network is a trusted authority (TA) that is responsible for the root certificate gen-
eration and validation. Moreover, cellular operators are assumed to be responsible
for security, anonymity, and privacy aspects of their users. Each user device thus
obtains its own certificate signed by TA as soon as it connects to the cellular net-
work for the first time. This step is required to ensure the validity of other users
and prevent from the subsequent person-in-the-middle types of attacks on the direct
link. This thesis classifies users based on their cellular connection availability as
well as the fact of their association to a certain secure group: a light device has an
active, reliable cellular connection; a dark device does not have a reliable cellular
connection, but used to have it in the past; a blank device is the one wishing to join
the coalition for the first time. In what follows, the author addresses the crucial
procedures of coalition initialization and formation.
As suggested in the previous Chapter, a remote server in the network core or in the
Internet operates as a trusted authority for the application users, i.e., the server
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certificate PKTR, NTR is distributed along with the application though the reposi-
tory as it is shown in Figure 4.3. Importantly, all the cellular base stations of the
operator are connected to this server and may concurrently distribute the coalition
certificates signed by the TA, that is, PKc and SKc. Alternatively, those certificates
may be distributed directly via a cellular link from the TA.
Recalling the above, all the communicating devices have a pre-generated set of
parameters: IDi is a unique identifier assigned for the ith device using a particular
application and PKTR is a trusted authority certificate in order to verify the validity
of the coalition and other devices (users). Additionally, each of the D2D partners
would obtain a PKc in relation to a specific coalition and then generate the PKi – its
own public key, the secret key SKi, and a certificate share certi signed by the SKc.
Here, the author defines certi as a primitive for the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme,
i.e., the RSA-based algorithm for the sake of simplicity. These parameters are, in
turn, required for the appropriate protocol operation in our target D2D scenario.
Trusted Authority
...
PKTR
Device:
 IDi
 PKTR
 PKC
 PKi, PKC
 SKC
Coalition:
 PKC, PKTR
BS1 BSk BSm
ID1 ID2 IDi IDn
IDj
...
Figure 4.3 Network topology from the coalition’s point of view
Initially, it is required that all of the devices have a reliable cellular connection to the
TA and thus the author of this work outlines the case for a new blank device to join
a coalition of light devices. Importantly, the actual cellular connection status of
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the joining device is not important for the proposed protocol operation. However, as
the existence of two protocol stacks for different connectivity states is assumed (ad
hoc for WiFi and infrastructure for LTE), there is a need to consider these in details.
For the infrastructure case, certificate distribution is a well-known PKI task, i.e., a
new device is requesting the base station directly to join the target coalition. The
BS then has to redistribute the new certificates for all the communicating devices
belonging to this coalition.
On the other hand, the cellular connection may be unavailable for (some of) the
devices in the coalition when a new device requests to join it – this is the case when
a blank device is joining the dark group. Accordingly, the joining device is initialized
by generating the PKi and SKi. Based on the fact that none of the devices have
their connection to the TA at the moment, the author relies on the coalition itself
when admitting the additional device. This, in turn, requires a preset parameter
included into the PKc certificate, which is a threshold value of k characterizing the
number of devices in the target coalition that have a right to allow the new device
to join it. This threshold value is chosen at the stage of coalition initialization and
may vary based on the number of devices n and/or other factors; thereby a new
certificate would be obtained for the joining user that is indistinguishable for the
base station.
From the mathematical point of view, this procedure may be implemented at the
base station side as follows
f(x) = ak−1xk−1 + ak−2xk−2 + ...+ a1x+ SKc,
f(0) = SKc,
(4.1)
where ai is the generated polynomial indexes, k is the preset threshold value, x is
the unique device identifier IDi, and SKc is the coalition secret generated for the
secure group. Again, for the infrastructure case, the procedure in question is fairly
straightforward, but in the distributed scenario the grouped devices should construct
a secret for the new user without the cellular connectivity and not disclosing this
secret to anyone. For both of the above cases, the certificate component for the jth
device is calculated as
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Figure 4.4 Protocol operation in case of reliable cellular connectivity
certj = PKj
f(0)
mod Nc, (4.2)
where PKj is generated by the device with additional salt sj: (PKj + sj), f(0) is
the coalition secret obtained with equation 4.1, which can be either recovered or
used at the base station itself, and Nc is generated at the coalition initialization
stage as well.
In the case when the coalition is losing the cellular connection (that is, turns dark) 
and a new jth device is willing to join it, we should consider a more complicated 
distributed protocol operation, as it is shown in Figure 4.5. If at least k devices 
have agreed to let the new device in, then a Lagrange polynomial sequence [100] is 
employed by allowing one to obtain the value of the function at any point f(IDj ). 
Using the equation 4.1 in the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, f(IDi) could be 
obtained as
f(IDj) =
k∑
i=0
f(IDi)li(IDj), (4.3)
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Figure 4.5 Protocol operation in case of unreliable cellular connectivity
where k is the threshold value and li is obtained as
li(IDj) =
∏
0≤m≤k
m6=i
IDj − IDm
IDi − IDm mod ϕ(Nc), (4.4)
where devices obtain their shares by utilizing the standard Shamir’s mechanism
and ϕ is the Euler’s formula, given that the computations are done in the modular
arithmetic.
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Importantly, parts of the equation 4.3 are calculated individually at the device side 
and it is not allowed to distribute/share these between the devices due to the fact 
that their own secrets are involved into the generation process, whereas the IDs 
are publicly available. The required protocol steps are given in Figure 4.5 and 
detailed as follows:
1. The joining jth device is sending its request along with its IDj to the first one
of the devices that has agreed to admit the former into the coalition.
2. The device with ID1 is calculating its part based on equation 4.3 and adds its
salt to the result f(IDi) = f(IDi)li(IDj) + si, where si is stored in memory.
3. The first device is then sending its result to the next device.
4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated for all of the k devices.
5. The kth device is sending the final sum back to the joining jth device, which
then adds its salt sj to the equation and sends it to the first device.
6. All of the k devices are excluding their salts one by one similarly to the salt
adding procedure.
7. The jth device is excluding its salt an by doing so obtains its needed secret
f(IDj).
The following protocol step is to generate the certificate for the newly joining device.
For the infrastructure case, it can be obtained by using the equation 4.2. In the
distributed scenario, k devices can recover f(0) by grouping together as
certj = PK
SKc
j mod Nc = PK
f(0)
j mod Nc =
k∏
i=0
PK
f(IDi)
i mod Nc, (4.5)
which should be calculated similarly to equation 4.1.
Further, there is a need to consider the situation when the device is leaving its
coalition based on e.g., weak proximity. The respective decision may be made by
the group or by the device itself. For the infrastructure case this action is nearly
trivial, whereas for the distributed scenario the respective operation has been shown
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previously. Importantly, the main challenge here is still rooted into the key re-
generation process for the updated dark group when excluding the jth device. Note
that SKc and PKc should be kept unchanged while new keys are re-generated and
re-distributed for the updated coalition. Here, it is essential to follow the rule: the
devices reaching cellular coverage again should be verified for their coalition mem-
bership. In addition, as it has been mentioned before, SKc must not be recovered by
any of the communicating devices. Therefore, f(IDi) should be reevaluated while
keeping the original SKc, which can be calculated as
f(IDi) = bk−1xk−1 + ...+ b1x+ SKc, (4.6)
where indexes bk−1 = ak−1 + ∆k−1 and ∆i may be generated by one of the trusted
devices in the coalition. Accordingly, new keys could be derived for each user in the
new group and then re-generate the certificates for all except the rogue device
f(IDi) = ak−1xk−1+∆k−1xk−1+ ...+a1x+∆1x+SKc = f(0)+∆k−1xk−1+ ...+∆1x.
(4.7)
Finally, it should be noted that if a new device (or a group of the devices) acquires its
new key, then it is not required to specify the source – it can be obtained directly from
other coalition and does not depend on the connectivity state. However, this solution
potentially accentuates an important security challenge: if there are k malicious
users, they can form their own group and exclude other devices one by one. The
author, however, considers this situation unlikely and leaves its consideration to the
future research activity. In summary, the work arrives at a point of the complete
mathematical model for the proposed D2D-centric information security protocol,
and hence the discussion can now proceed with outlining the potential scenarios for
secure proximity-based communications enabled by it.
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5. PERFOMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed information security approach sum-
marized in Chapter 4, a simulation-based campaign has been conducted using the 
WINTERsim tool available at [44]. The reference scenario consists of a 3GPP LTE 
BS (termed eNodeB) with the radius of 100m, where users are uniformly distributed 
within its coverage in the range [10, 100]. The movements of the users are charac-
terized by a Levy Flight mobility model with an α-value equal to 1.5 and the user 
speed varying in the range [0.2, 2.0]m/s. An example of user mobility pattern is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The reason for choosing the Levy Flight mobility model is 
that recent investigations reveal that movement of people may follow characteristic 
patterns, where numerous short runs are interchanged with occasional long-distance 
travels [101], [102], and [103]. The parameter α allows to adjust the form of the 
step-size distributions.
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Figure 5.1 A sample user movement pattern with Levy Flight mobility model
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The simulation environment thus translates into a typical pedestrian scenario, as
ratified in the 3GPP specification TS 36.304 [104]. In addition, the multimedia
traffic within the considered scenario is modeled after a video download application
with relatively long inter-arrival time and the packet size of 100 MB. The main
system parameters are summarized in Table 5.1. The three performance metrics
that this work focuses on are: user latency, that is, the end-to-end delay to download
the multimedia content, average user relevant throughput, that is, the throughput
achieved by the UE when it downloads the desired content either over the LTE or
the WiFi-Direct link, and blocking probability, that is, the number of interruptions
experienced by the user during a download session. We compare the conventional
network operation against the security-centric approach outlined in Chapter 4.
Table 5.1 The main simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Cell radius 100 m
Maximum D2D range 30 m
Number of users 20
Target data rate on LTE link 10 Mbps
Target data rate on D2D link 40 Mbps
eNodeB Tx power 46 dBm
UE Tx power 23 dBm
D2D link setup 1 s
Cellular bandwidth 5 MHz
Mobility model Levy Flight
Simulation time 15 min
20 40 60 80 10012
13
14
15
16
17
18
Number of UEs
Av
er
ag
e 
UE
 la
te
nc
y 
(m
s)
 
 
Proposed Security Approach
Standard Security Approach
(a) Varying the mobility intensity
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.011
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Speed of UEs (m/s)
Av
er
ag
e 
UE
 la
te
nc
y 
(m
s)
 
 
Proposed Security Approach
Standard Security Approach
(b) Varying UE speeds
Figure 5.2 Average user latency (for 100 UEs)
First, consider the effects of user mobility on the average latency in the proposed
framework (see Figures 5.2(a)– 5.3(a)). As one can observe, the latency decreases
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Figure 5.3 Average user latency and throughput
linearly with the growing intensity of mobility either by varying the number of users
or the mobility intensity. The reason is that the increase in the user speed translates
into a higher number of contacts among them. This way, users can download the
content over the WiFi-Direct link with higher data rates. However, the conventional
security approach performs better compared to the proposed solution. This is due
to the fact that our security scheme introduces an additional delay when users are
in proximity (can establish a direct D2D connection), but not under the network
coverage, i.e., Case 3 in Figure 4.2. This effect is particularly visible when the
number of users is high (i.e., 100), because the opportunities to establish direct
connections become more abundant. However, the advantage of using our approach
is in that, generally, the conventional solutions are unable to provide any type of
secure connectivity when there is a lack of cellular coverage.
The average throughput experienced by the users as a function of the number of
UEs and their mobility intensity is shown in Figure 5.3(b). It is important to note
that the proposed security algorithm demonstrates better performance compared
to the conventional solution. The reason is that the proposed approach delivers
connectivity to users that are in a D2D transmission range, but not under cellular
coverage, Case 3 in Figure 4.2. In this case, the extra throughput is obtained at
a cost of additional delay to establish a direct D2D connection and execute all the
needed security procedures. The amount of the additional delay is due to execution
of the security primitives that have to be run among the D2D users as reported in
Table 6.1.
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Figure 5.4 Blocking probability
Finally, the blocking probability as a function of the number of interrupted download
sessions experienced by the users is summarized in Figure 5.4(a) and Figure 5.4(b).
As it can be seen in the plots, the proposed security approach performs better
compared to the conventional security solution. The explanation is again that the
proposed framework is able to guarantee connectivity even if the users are not under
network coverage (i.e., Case 3 in Figure 4.2). As a consequence, at the cost of extra
delay, the users enjoy longer download sessions and increase their chances to obtain
the desired multimedia content.
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6. PROOF OF THE CONCEPT
In order to conduct a comprehensive study and reveal the practical promises of D2D
communications, the author has participated in designing a trial development and
deployment program. The trial was aimed at demonstrating how secure direct con-
nectivity paradigm could be when seamlessly integrated into a real-world, operator-
grade cellular network with minimal modifications and overheads, as well as within
a reasonable time frame. The secondary goal was to quantify the gains that could
be achieved by a fully-functional, operator- supported D2D system. To complete
these challenging objectives, the implementation team has defined a deployment
time constraint of one month and assigned a group of six qualified engineers for the
said implementation.
As a basis for the trial, the experimental LTE network of Brno University of Tech-
nology (BUT), Czech Republic was used, which supports most of the functionality
expected of LTE Release 10 systems. During the trial, the LTE network of BUT was
updated with custom implementation of secure direct communications functionality.
This has allowed to perform live D2D integration trials, along with corresponding
performance evaluations.
6.1 Implementation of the mechanism in live LTE core
In this section, to evaluate the operation of the information security framework,
tests in the real-life environment are performed. For the server side, the CentOs
virtual machine [105] with two virtual processors Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5472 both
running 3.00GHz, 6MB cache size is used. As a mobile device, a Jolla smartphone1.
running Sailfish OS with Qualcomm Snapdragon 400 1.4 GHz dual-core processor
(8930AA) is selected. The comparison of the experimental results for the RSA
algorithm using OpenSSL [106] is summarized in Table 6.1. The results obtained
1See Jolla smartphone – specification: https://jolla.com/jolla
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with a more powerful server-side processor are approximately 10 times better than 
those obtained on the user side, as it is shown in Table 6.1 and in more detail 
in Figure 6.1. In this study, the standard software library available on most 
of the mobile devices is used, implying that the results can be improved by 
utilizing specialized lightweight cryptography and hardware on-chip solutions.
Table 6.1 Security primitives: execution time
Primitive Server, µs Mobile Device, µs
RSA 512 public key 7.28 109.32
RSA 512 private key 99.95 1157.80
RSA 1024 public key 19.57 305.81
RSA 1024 private key 352.38 5991.61
RSA 2048 public key 66.83 953.56
RSA 2048 private key 2158.89 35987
Random variable generation 7.23 24.95
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Figure 6.1 Execution time for a join user procedure (k = N/2)
Further, it was decided to construct a mobile application on top of Android platform
testing the feasibility of the security mechanism utilization on the “average” user de-
vices. This application has the functionality of a secure messenger and utilizes the
proposed information security primitives. To familiarize the reader with the corre-
sponding framework, the author first outlines the considered network architecture.
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Figure 6.2 Test 3GPP LTE deployment: structure and main modules
The experimental 3GPP LTE deployment employed for the purposes of this pro-
totype implementation is located at BUT, Czech Republic. It is a practical, fully-
operational cellular infrastructure with all the necessary system modules imple-
mented in hardware. The described LTE testbed (see Figure 6.2) serves the pur-
poses of research and education for 4 years already and its essential components are
listed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Main components of the experimental 3GPP LTE deployment
Core units Components Description
EPC
UGW (SGW, PGW) Fully redundant 10Gbps links.
MME Interface mirroring for probe-
HSS based analysis.
IMS
IMS-HSS IMS core + RCS,
ENUM/DNS Enables VoLTE,
S-CSCF/MRFC Public Safety Answering Point,
P-CSCF/A-SBC Additional HSS,
MRFP Full redundancy.
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The corresponding heterogeneous RAN components feature three 700MHz indoor
cells operating in band 17 (AT&T) and one 1800MHz cell where the key parameters
are 5MHz FDD with 2x2 MIMO. Further, EPS-IMS network includes the imple-
mentation of one outdoor cell in band 3 (1800MHz). Together with the said LTE
cells, three WiFi access points (APs) operating in 2.4GHz and 5GHz ISM bands are
incorporated to offer the packet-switched data access services (e.g., VoIP, VoLTE)
over LTE and WiFi RAN infrastructure. The Evolved Packet Core (EPC) enables
high data rate services (up to 40Mbps for download and up to 16Mbps for upload)
with the appropriate QoS and QoE provisions (up to 100,000 served user devices are
supported). This full-featured deployment mostly accommodates the research and
educational purposes by allowing full access to the experimental cellular network in
order to obtain deeper understanding of its operation as well as open door to rapid
and efficient prototyping of new technology.
In order to enable the intended trial, several modifications to the experimental LTE
system had to be done. First, the author of the thesis participated in the develop-
ment of an additional server application that supports IPv4-based communications
between mobile devices in addition to security certificate generation and distribution
functionality. The main purpose of the latter is to allow for secure communications
over LTE and WiFi radio interfaces.
A major benefit of direct connectivity is communications without the need for any in-
frastructure hot-spots. In other words, users can communicate directly even outside
of network coverage, both WiFi and LTE. In this case, users would face a challenge
of secure connection establishment, that is, when the managing entity is not directly
available. Broadly, the modern wireless networks widely use the IPv4 protocol, and
thus each of the mobile users in the network acquires a public IP address for its data
connectivity. This address is conventionally provided by the cellular infrastructure.
In case of network-assisted D2D connectivity, IP addresses for users that communi-
cate over a direct channel are also generated by the 3GPP LTE core when it has a
reliable link to the corresponding server. For D2D communications outside of cellu-
lar coverage, new rules and routing protocols should be constructed. In connection
to the above, the effective firewall policies applied inside the cellular network core
may restrict direct access from one device to another and hence limit the direct
communications opportunities. Therefore, an additional firewall policy to allow for
direct connectivity between the cellular network users and the network server was
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Figure 6.3 Prototype implementation of a D2D system
implemented. To this end, the author utilized a specifically-defined port in order to
offer the proof of the concept, see Figure 6.3.
For this demo implementation, the LTE system with a server running inside the
core is utilized. The D2D server is represented as a Linux machine that has a
Python service running in the background. The role of the latter is not only to
act as the Certificate Authority (CA), but also manage authentication and logical
IP association procedures. We used the Easy-RSA library as a component of the
OpenVPN framework for certificate generation. In this demo, the Android-based
smart-phones, Samsung Galaxy S4, running non-rooted firmware version 4.4.2. were
employed (see Figure 6.4). In the test mobile application, the author of this work
implemented a modified Shamir secret sharing scheme focusing on the java.security.*
library. Due to the limitations of WiFi-Direct on Android, the author has decided
to use an isolated WiFi AP running OpenWRT to emulate the distributed network.
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Figure 6.4 Snapshot of the running demo
6.2 Integration challenges
In this Section, the author of this thesis discusses the important aspects being faced
during the prototype implementation, as well as offers the key numerical results.
In the process of developing this demo, a number of challenges regarding the LTE
system operation, networking, and routing on the device side are solved in addition
to many smaller issues related to implementing security on Android. Particularly,
(i) the effective LTE firewall policies are modified, (ii) a custom routing protocol
(LTE to WiFi) is developed and implemented, and (ii) a modified Shamir secret
sharing scheme together with all the required modular algebra primitives tailored
for Android is constructed.
The main and the most essential learning while working with the real LTE core
has been in that its DHCP server was not operating as expected. The devices were
assigned IPv4 addresses from the same pool, but from different, random subnets.
Clearly, changing the subnetworks on the device side resulted in connectivity fail-
ures. To resolve these issues, the author had to additionally conduct thorough traffic
analysis to identify the said fault of the network configuration. In the end, LTE IP
addresses and subnets have been set statically for each utilized SIM card. However,
the community is looking forward to having IPv6 support in next-generation net-
works, which the author hopes could resolve the routing and identification issues in
a more comprehensive way.
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Figure 6.5 Comparing the time to reconstruct a secret
Further, the proposed modified Shamir secret sharing scheme has been tested. In
particular, the time needed to reconstruct the secret on modern non-restricted
smart-phones was obtained. The respective results are visualized in Figure 6.5,
where one can observe that the proposed scheme is not taking up to 100ms to pro-
duce a new point for a newly-joining user or for excluding an existing user from the
coalition.
Next, Figure 6.6 highlights the trade-off between the system operational complexity
and the selected threshold value of k. Here, the level of trust is indicated in percents
– the time of user inclusion/exclusion may vary dramatically as a result of the desired
level of trust between the voting users.
To this end, the discussed numerical results may become an important considera-
tion for resource-constrained devices (e.g., wearables), as the computational power
of those may have difficulty to satisfy the requirements of the security primitives
utilized by our current solution. Improving the proposed constructs with the meth-
ods of lightweight cryptography is therefore the ongoing direction of the author’s
research.
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Figure 6.6 Dependence of the recovery time on the threshold value of k
6.3 Feasibility study for constrained devices
The Internet of Things (IoT) creates the means for interconnection of highly hetero-
geneous entities and networks bringing a variety of communications patterns [107].
IoT in general and wearable technology in particular empower the industry to de-
velop new technology in almost unlimited numbers. Today, the term wearables
stands for connected devices that collect data, track activities and improve user ex-
perience across different application domains. From the IoT point of view, wearables
could be characterized as networked “smart devices” equipped with microchips, sen-
sors, and wireless communications interfaces deployed in the immediate vicinity of
their owner [108].
To prove the feasibility of modern security solutions on the user devices, today’s
pioneers as well as already widely used devices have been selected in accordance
to three main categories: (i) smartphones, (ii) smart watches, and (iii) embedded
devices, see Figure 6.7.
As representatives of the first group, the author selects devices built on two main
mobile platforms: Android and iOS. More specifically, Samsung Galaxy S4 (SGH-
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I337) and Jiayu S3 Advanced (JY-S3), both running Android 4.4.2, Apple iPhone
4s (MD128CS/A) running the iOS 7.1.2, and Apple iPhone 6 (MG4F2CN/A) with
the latest iOS 9.1 were evaluated.
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Figure 6.7 Wearable devices used in this performance evaluation
To provide a comprehensive evaluation at par with the selected smartphones, the
smart watches running Android Wear and Apple WatchOS were also employed. The
utilized devices are correspondingly Sony Smart Watch 3 (SWR-50) with Android
Wear 5.1.1 and Apple Watch 42mm Sport edition with WatchOS 2.0.
Following the fact that most of today’s embedded devices (often named the IoT de-
velopment boards) are intended to be used also as wearables, the author of this work
decided to additionally evaluate the well-known examples from this class: Intelr
Edison2, Raspberry Pi 1 (Model B), and Raspberry Pi 2 (Model B). Both Raspberry
Pi devices run the latest version of Raspbian OS (Jessie, v 8.0) together with the
latest version of Oracle JDK (1.8.0-b132). Edison features a Ubilinux 3.10.17-yocto-
standard-r2 build equipped with JDK (1.8.0_66-b17). In more detail, Edison is a
2See Intelr Edison. One Tiny Platform, Endless Possibility: http://www.intel.de/content/
www/de/de/do-it-yourself/edison.html
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small-sized computing module aiming to enable the next generation of wearables
and IoT devices, where size and power consumption are extremely important fac-
tors. In addition, Edison may be attached to a number of different extension boards,
for example, to enable Arduino compatibility. Hence, Edison empowers a range of
different use cases, whereas Raspberry Pi might be more suitable for graphics and
multimedia related applications and products.
Table 6.3 Selected devices with their corresponding specifications
Device Type SoC Processor RAM
Apple Watch Smart Watch APL0778 520MHz Single-core Cortex-A7 512MB
Sony SmartWatch 3 Smart Watch BCM47531 1.2GHz Quad-Core ARM A7 512MB
Apple iPhone 4s Smartphone APL A5 800MHz Dual-Core Cortex A9 64bit 512MB
Apple iPhone 6 Smartphone APL A9 1.5GHz Dual-Core Cortex A57 64bit 1GB
Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4 Smartphone APQ8064T 1.6GHz Dual-Core Cortex-A15 2GB
Jiayu S3 Advanced Smartphone MT6752 1.7GHz Octa-Core 64bit Cortex A53 3GB
Intelr Edison IoT Dev. Board Atom+ Quark 500MHz Intelr AtomTM CPU, 100Mhz MCU 1GB
Raspberry Pi 1 model B IoT Dev. Board BCM2835 700MHz Single-Core ARM Cortex-A6 512MB
Raspberry Pi 2 model B IoT Dev. Board BCM2836 900MHz Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A7 1GB
The following text aims to evaluate the performance of the constrained devices listed
in Table 6.3. For Raspberry Pi, Android, and Android Wear devices, the security
tests have been executed as a standalone Java application. To run the framework
on Apple devices (iPhone 4s, iPhone 6, and Apple Watch), the author has ported
the logic and created a standalone application written in Objective-C programming
language. To make the assessment conditions even more equivalent, all unnecessary
background processes were terminated and the flight mode was utilized whenever
possible. To execute the developed application on the restricted Intelr Edison board
it was necessary to prepare a Linux build equipped with JRE. Further, an executable
jar file was designed, deployed, and executed on the device.
All the tested devices are classified based on their performance metrics into two
groups: Smart devices and IoT boards. As the main user-driven evaluation criterion
to characterize this equipment, the security primitive execution time is selected.
This is due to the unification and well-acceptance of this approach in addition to
the fact that some of the devices are hardware restricted and, therefore, could not
provide any other valuable and unified evaluation metric. The following results
have been obtained as an average of 1000 executions for each operation to achieve
statistically-reliable data.
First, Figure 6.8 indicates the average time overhead for encryption and decryption
operations of the conventional non-optimized RSA schemes with correspondence to
different decimal digits. Public and private keys were generated using OpenSSL
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with default parameters. Adopting a security value of 1024 or 2048 bits and de-
fault public exponent (3 bytes) (which is reasonable for the constrained wireless
devices [109]), the RSA encryption operation remains under 1ms on a typical An-
droid smartphone, around 2.5ms for a Smart Watch, and less than 12ms on Intelr
Edison and Raspberry Pi 2.
 RSA2048
Decryption
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
Ti
m
e,
 m
s
Sony Smart Watch 3
Samsung Galaxy S4
JIAYU S3 Advanced
Intel Edison
Raspberry Pi 1 B
Raspberry Pi 2 B
Apple Watch
iPhone 6
iPhone 4s
RSA1024 RSA2048
Encryption
0
5
10
15
20
25
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
Ti
m
e,
 m
s 
RSA1024 
Figure 6.8 RSA execution time on the IoT device
Decryption time looks less optimistic and, therefore, for an Android phone it takes
around 25ms, but up to 100ms for an iPhone. Similar behavior is observed for
Android Wear and Apple Watch – here, the values are 35ms and 200ms corre-
spondingly. On the IoT boards, the execution may take up to half a second, which
may still be feasible for delay-tolerant applications. Concerning smart devices, it
can be stated that Sony Watch is demonstrating high performance even though it is
not classified as a standalone device. Interestingly, here and further on, iPhone 4s
is sometimes showing better results than iPhone 6 or Apple Watch, which may be
due to the lack of the power consumption optimization feature on the version of iOS
that was introduced only starting 9.0.1. Hence, CPU utilization is able to approach
90%, while for the latest models it remains well below 50%.
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Figure 6.9 Hashing and AES execution times on the IoT device
Taking into account such basic operation as Hashing function, the execution of SHA1
and SHA2 (SHA-256) has been evaluated on all of the devices. The corresponding
results are summarized in Figure 6.9. It could be concluded that for all of our test
devices SHA1 and SHA2 are hardware optimized and mainly depend on the utilized
equipment. As an example of the data encryption, the author of this work used
AES 128 cipher. The corresponding results still follow the execution time pattern
of public-key cryptosystems and hashing functions for all of the chosen devices.
To provide a clear viewpoint of testing, Table 6.4 contains the information of which
devices best match which cryptographic operations – with respect to HW parameters
in Table 6.3.
Table 6.4 Suitability of wearables for cryptographic operations over acceptable time
Device Cryptographic operations
Apple Watch SHA1 / 2; Curve operations
Sony SmartWatch 3 RSA1024, 2048 E /D; Curve operations
Intelr Edison RSA2048 E /D; AES; SHA2
Raspberry Pi 1 model B RSA1024 E /D
Raspberry Pi 2 model B RSA1024, 2048 E /D; AES; SHA1
Therefore, the author concludes that modern wearable electronics has already reached
the computational power of a two-year-old smartphone and thus the IoT world ful-
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fills the security requirements of today. Constrained but powerful IoT devices, like
Intel Edison, are designed so that the energy consumption is minimized. Due to
that fact, the computational power is somewhat lowered, but this class of devices
appears to be an attractive enabler for the required levels of information security.
Importantly, the Raspberry Pi board, which is often nicknamed “a tiny and afford-
able computer” is demonstrating more modest performance results comparing to a
small Edison chip designed specifically for the IoT-centric use cases.
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7. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this Chapter, the author of the manuscript targets to highlight the most essential
use cases for direct connectivity in the 5G ecosystem. Currently, the lion’s share of
the expected mobile traffic growth comes from peer-to-peer services that naturally
involve clients in close proximity [7] (see Figure 7.1). The potential proximity-based
communications also enable shorter and lower-to-the-ground radio links without the
cost of additional infrastructure. Hence, we envision that whenever possible the
neighboring client devices will use their direct connectivity capabilities, instead of
infrastructure (cellular) links. Consequently, D2D connections are anticipated to
become an effective solution that would unlock substantial gains in capacity [110]
and relieve congestion [9] on the way to 5G mobile networks. For mobile network
operators, D2D connectivity is becoming vital to enable traffic oﬄoading from the
core network and to realize efficient support of social networking through device
localization.
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Figure 7.1 Urban network-assisted D2D applications
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The list of well-studied and novel D2D use cases is as following:
• Use case 1. Localized traffic oﬄoading.
Let us consider a case, where a local media server is setup at a musical festival
to offer a substantial amount of promotional material for visitors to download.
The phone calls and continuous Internet access for the cellular users should be
handled reliably at the same time. The D2D communications may be consid-
ered as an effective solution for the local media service access while the cellular
connectivity would operate in a conventional way. Moreover, D2D communi-
cations may be utilized to upload the data to the media server as well [11].
• Use case 2. Voluntary cooperation between familiar peers.
Mobile phones could be considered as selfish nodes without any default coop-
erating willingness, i.e. such a node is usually interested in maximizing its own
benefit or, more specifically, throughput. Cooperation, in this sense, causes
reducing the overall benefits to some extent, i.e. such a cooperation can only
be established if fairness is guaranteed among these mobile users [7].
• Use case 3. Discovery of new (unfamiliar) people and services.
Promoted by Qualcomm [111], this scenario includes content sharing and mul-
tiplayer gaming in addition to location-based advertising [27].
• Use case 4. Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) scenarios.
In a national security and public safety situation or outside of cellular cov-
erage, cellular mobile devices could communicate without network assistance,
similarly to the Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) technology [10].
• Use case 5. Caching of multimedia content.
Since modern mobile devices have large built-in memory resources, they can
effectively act as wireless caching stations. In this case, no additional infras-
tructure deployment is required and the substantial possible advantage of the
stations with this feature enabled is by being concentrated in those areas where
the highest demand occurs. The data transfer between the caching node and
a regular device essentially becomes “device-to-device” communications [67].
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• Use case 6. D2D-based multihop relaying (potential use of network coding).
It is proposed that by selecting an appropriate initial pushing set of seeds and
utilizing D2D sharing, content can be disseminated efficiently while cellular
traffic can be reduced significantly [112].
• Use case 7. Wearable technology.
Knowing the fact that the smart wearable market’s global retail revenue will
triple by 2016, eventually reaching $53.2 billion by 2019, compared to the
$4.5 billion at the end of 2015 [113], the author stresses the need for controllable
interference also for the wearable devices [114].
The author of this work has listed just a few examples of the secure direct connec-
tivity scenarios. In the world of today, we are only limited by our imagination in
proposing those. On the other hand, as the technology is mainly driven by industry,
the proper standardization activities are required to support its growth.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter concludes the thesis with a review of several important topics. Proxim-
ity based communications is one of the key technologies within the rapidly maturing
5G ecosystem that would broadly enable both the owners of advanced wireless de-
vices as well as the smart and social IoT objects across diverse, pervasive platforms
to effectively become a part of the cellular landscape. This, in turn, will pave
the way to improved cellular service provisioning by e.g., offering D2D-based data
relaying, content distribution and caching, or other forms of cooperative communica-
tions to augment the existing spectrum usage and device energy efficiency. Another
exciting research direction is to develop new mechanisms that take advantage of
the unique position of cellular operators – with their well-developed infrastructure
and pricing methods – to create incentives, win-win collaborative strategies, and
ultimately raise social awareness among spectrum owners, network operators, and
wireless device users. For 3GPP networks, the basic building blocks, associated pro-
tocol structures, and physical layer procedures are already being defined, while the
creation of corresponding incentives and social awareness schemes that engage users
as part of the service provisioning effort remains in strong need of further research.
This thesis demonstrated application of combined de-/centralized networking con-
cept utilization in implementing prototypes and demonstrators for emerging wireless
network architectures. Started with technological background and followed by an-
ticipated development challenges, the proposed security approach demonstrated an
implementation possibility for considered industry-driven scenarios including con-
ventional and constrained devices involved. Particularly, the proposed information
security framework, simulation results, and implemented prototype supporting the
corresponding research resulted in several journal and conference publications. Fea-
sibility of the implemented secure network assisted communications for D2D traffic
was also validated during full-scale practical trial on a live network deployment.
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